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LECTURE
Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in
Nineteenth Century America
HENDRIK HARTOG*
This lecture sketches a bit of the legal normative universe within which
antebellum American women and men lived their lives as wives and hus-
bands. I focus here on the nineteenth-century judicial treatment of two fa-
miliar forms of exit from unsatisfactory marriages: by contractual agreement
and by judicial divorce. The story I want to tell is a paradoxical one. On the
one hand, I mean to show how seriously courts took their commitment to
conserve and enforce the received institution of marriage against the efforts
of various couples to negotiate private understandings about (and endings to)
their marriages. On the other hand, I also want to show the contradictory
willingness of courts to recognize and legitimize a variety of private, individ-
ualized, marital arrangements.
When I began working on this lecture, I thought of it as an opportunity to
set out the terms of the institution of marriage in antebellum America. It
would provide a preface to my ongoing, long-term project: a history of legal
struggles between husbands and wives since the early nineteenth century. I
wanted to set the scene of the institution first, before I moved on to the legal
lives and stories of the women and men who lived within the institution.
I quickly found, however, that a formal distinction I had drawn-between
the institution of marriage and the identities of the persons who lived within
that institution-kept breaking down. At times it appeared that legal mar-
riage was nothing but the legal identities of husband and wife. At other
times particular courts insisted on the existence of a marriage where there
was no longer functionally either husband or wife. I was confused and,
sometimes, I still am.
What is marriage? Today, a marriage is commonly viewed as the private
property of husbands and wives who mold their marriages to suit their pur-
* Professor of Law and History, University of Wisconsin-Madison. This is a footnoted and
slightly edited version of the Phillip K. Hart Memorial Lecture, delivered at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center on April 10, 1991. I thank Dean Judith Areen and the members of the
Georgetown faculty for their kindness on that occasion. Early and continuing conversations with
Elizabeth Clark, Michael Grossberg, Nancy Hartog, Willard Hurst, and Vicki Schultz have made
this a better piece than it could have been otherwise. Jim Oldham and Wayne Bodle were kind
enough to share research material with me. Marky Rath provided research assistance. I dedicate
this published lecture to the memory of my father, Floris Hartog, who died while it was in the last
stages of editing.
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poses and identities. There are, then, as many types of marriages as there are
married couples, each one the product of the distinctive choices and invest-
ments of its partners.
By contrast, all participants in the antebellum Anglo-American legal cul-
ture understood what marriage was.' At least until the middle years of the
nineteenth century, being married meant subjecting oneself to a known and
coercive public relationship. By the 1840s there was a growing industry of
legal reformers proposing revisions, modifications, and transformations of
the received rules of marriage. But what reformers were challenging was
never at issue. Reformers knew their enemy, just as defenders of the status
quo knew what they were defending. Marriage had an unambiguous and
inescapable set of meanings (although, like most unambiguous and ines-
capable terms, the meanings of marriage could be elaborated and extended in
confusing ways, and to every principle there were exceptions that under the
right circumstances might engulf it).2
What was marriage? According to the mid-nineteenth-century edition of
Webster's dictionary, marriage was "the act of uniting man and woman, as
husband and wife, for life."' 3 To nineteenth-century eyes, that definition had
four overlapping elements: (1) marriage united a man and a woman, giving
them a singular identity; (2) marriage transformed men and women into hus-
1. By defining the legal culture as Anglo-American, I mean to exclude from my generalization
those who lived under and subscribed to Spanish and Mexican legal regimes of marriage. See Hans
W. Baade, The Form of Marriage in Spanish North America, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1975). Who
"all participants" included within the Anglo-American legal culture is, of course, a complex issue.
Obviously, African American slaves and Native Americans should not be viewed as participants.
On the other hand, my reading of the case law has convinced me that it is a mistake to assume that
the law of marriage and coverture had relevance only for the relatively well-to-do. A large por-
tion-I suspect the vast majority-of the married white population would have taken the normative
understandings I explore in this chapter as descriptive of their situations.
2. On the continuing restrictiveness of the legal definition of marriage, consider that a leading
scholar of American family law could write as late as 1975 that marital relations among the Chero-
kee did not qualify as real marriages, using the received Anglo-American definition. Henry H.
Foster, Indian and Common Law Marriages, 3 INDIAN L. REV. 83 (1975). He described the Native
American relation of husband and wife as existing in a "state of nature," that "may bear a marked
similarity to the utopia recommended by Kate Millet, Shulamith Firestone, and others who have
been influenced by Frederick Engels and Lewis Henry Morgan." Id. at 89-90. There were no status
incidents, no obligation of fidelity, no marital property nor economic rights incident to the relation-
ship, and child rearing was more of a community undertaking. Id. at 90. In short, Native Ameri-
can marriage served a different function than that served by Anglo-American marriage.
3. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 695-96 (1856)
(revised by Chauncey Goodrich). The English judge, Lord Penzance, in the case of Hyde v. Hyde
and Woodmansee, I L.R.-P. & D. 130 (Mass., 1866), defined marriage as "the voluntary union for
life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 133. This definition has since
been repeated by courts on both sides of the Atlantic. Hyde dealt with the marriage of a Mormon
couple, both of whom were single at the time of their marriage. But, because polygamy was con-
templated and encouraged by the tenets of their religion, their union was not exclusively of one man
and one woman. Accordingly, it was not a marriage recognized by English law. Id. at 138.
[Vol. 80:95
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bands and wives; (3) marriage produced a public relationship, the terms of
which were not negotiable by the parties; and (4) marriage effected a perma-
nent transformation, one that would continue as long as both husband and
wife survived.
These themes hardly exhaust the social and legal implications of marriage.
Other aspects of the widely accepted understanding of marriage were so
foundational as to be beneath the contemplation of a nineteenth-century legal
consciousness. The definitional certainty that marriage was only available to
heterosexual couples is one example. Still, these four themes do help frame
the landscape of marriage, and in this lecture I will take two of them-the
notion of marriage as a non-negotiable public relationship and the notion of
marriage as, by definition, permanent-as my particular subjects.
What did it mean to be married? In the 1840s, as today, it meant that a
man and a woman had become husband and wife. However, what it meant
to be a husband or a wife then was strikingly different than today. In legal
understanding today (and probably in the experience of many), a wife and
her husband are two individuals who have contracted to live together, as a
result of which they jointly acquire legal and social privileges and some du-
ties and responsibilities. The identities of husband and wife are held lightly,
if at all. We (a complicated "we") generally retain our prior identities as
separate and unrelated individuals. In the words of Justice Brennan, a mar-
ried couple is "not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional make-up."' 4 To use the language of the model Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, to be married is legally nothing more than an agreement to
enter into "a personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out
of a civil contract." 5 One always remains an individual. Just married. Or
not.
By contrast, the lawmakers and the theologians who constructed the nine-
teenth-century marriage ceremony, as well as the women and men who en-
tered into it, expected that the individual identities of women and men would
be changed permanently by the ceremony. To become a husband or a wife
was to inhabit a legal role, a legal personality, that carried with it strong and
stringent public expectations as to conduct and responsibility. That legal
person, that collection of legal rights and duties-the husband, the wife-
existed regardless of an individual's relative discontent with the identity.
A marriage was created by the contract of a woman and a man. Yet, the
terms of the identities marriage created could not be understood as the prod-
uct or the creation of the will of two particular individuals. All husbands
4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
5. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, pt. II, § 201 (1973).
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were alike as were all wives. And it is to the generalized characteristics of
the legal personality of wife and husband that judges and others referred
when it might appear that they ought to have been discussing particular,
historically situated individuals with particular and distinctive life histories
and identities. 6
It is important not to forget that the stories in the judicial history of mar-
riage are about the ways that the individuals who embodied legal identities
diverted marital narratives away from expected paths and imposed individu-
alized and distinctive meanings on marital histories. The pages of the case
reports are full of women who wanted to keep their property and earnings
away from their husbands, about men who saw no reason to continue to
support their wives or children, about women who committed adultery,
about women who insisted on their right to keep custody and control over
their children at the time that the law ostensibly refused them that right,
about men who wandered away from their fimilies, and about women who
refused to live under their husband's roofs. In particular, these case reports
are full of stories about husbands and wives who either separated or divorced
and who negotiated with greater or lesser success about the terms of their
partings.
But these stories are also about the sometimes successful efforts of judges
and other legal authorities to reimpose predictable and generalized legal or-
der on those individual lives and about the punishments visited on those
whose individual lives diverged too sharply from their expected legal roles.
The individuals who brought marital conflict to courts were first subject to
legal categories, and only secondarily considered the subjects of individual
marital histories. Husbands and wives were repressed by their legal identi-
ties, even as they also struggled to change and to impose new meanings on
their legal personalities.
I. CONTRACTUAL ExITs
What did it mean to be married? All marriages were intended for life. But
in 1840, as now, many couples separated, and when they did so, they needed
to renegotiate the terms of their relationship. What was the body of law that
then confronted them?
The answer is complex, but can be illustrated by a relatively well-known
English judicial history. That history begins when Lord and Lady Lanes-
borough separated.7 Like many other separating couples both in England
6. For a helpful mapping of the moral and social significance of various legally ascribed identi-
ties, see AMELIE RORTY, Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals in MIND IN ACTION 78-100
(1988).
7. See Ringstead v. Lanesborough, 99 Eng. Rep. 610 (1783).
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and in America, the Lanesboroughs negotiated a "separate maintenance"
agreement, leaving property with Lady Lanesborough in trust, "to her sole
and separate use." By the agreement, she gained the right to live alone and
assumed responsibility for her own debts. His lordship moved to his lands in
Ireland, while she remained in England. In England, she contracted debts,
and, when the creditors sued her for payment, she asserted her coverture
(i.e., her identity as a married woman).8 As a wife, as a feme-covert, she
could not be held liable for debts contracted to supply her with "neces-
saries." Such debts were legally considered contracted with the implied con-
sent of her husband.
According to settled eighteenth-century law, the creditors should have
been nonsuited-that is, creditors should have been compelled to seek their
remedy from Lord Lanesborough (or, rather, the executors of his estate,
since he was dead by the time the case came to trial). The agreement be-
tween husband and wife that the wife should henceforth be responsible for
her own debts was, as Lady Lanesborough's defense indicated, a nullity.9 A
contract to vary the public terms of the marital agreement violated a funda-
mental notion of what it meant to be married. Even very wealthy and aristo-
cratic parties should not be able to slough off the duties and responsibilities
that accompanied marital rights.
Yet, when Chief Justice Lord Mansfield came to decide the case in 1783,
he noted the prevalence and innocence of these "separate maintenance agree-
ments" that recreated the wife as a single woman, a feme-sole. Mansfield
understood, of course, that, at common law, a wife had "no civil capacity or
power of acting without her husband, under whose absolute control she [was]
supposed to be."' 0 But, to Mansfield, separate maintenance agreements re-
flected a successful alteration of societal norms. Such agreements should be
binding on wives because "the law must adapt itself to the various situations
of mankind."'" Alternatively stated: "The fashion of the times has intro-
duced an alteration, and now husband and wife may, for many purposes, be
separated, and possess separate property, a practice unknown to the old
law."' 12 Thus, in the Lanesborough case, and in two famous succeeding
cases, Lord Mansfield held that a wife who negotiated with her husband for
8. Id.
9. Formally, the agreement was between the husband and the wife's trustee and prochein ami
(next friend or legal representative) since husband and wife could not contract with each other. In
theory the separation occurred "through the intervention of trustees." ROPER SAMUEL DONNISON
ROPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY ARISING FROM THE RELATION BETWEEN Hus-
BAND AND WIFE 272-73 (London, 1824).
10. Ringsted v. Lady Lanesborough, Scone Palace Manuscripts, Box 68, No. 29, quoted in Jim
Oldham, Background Essay, in THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ch. 22 (forthcoming 1992).
11. Barwell v. Brooks, 99 Eng. Rep. 702, 703 (1784).
12. Id.
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the right to act and receive credit as a feme-sole should be liable as such. 13
According to a familiar expectation of Anglo-American legal history, this
would be the end of the story, and a status relationship would have become a
contractual one. Like other areas of law infected by contractualism (labor
law is usually taken as the paradigm), domestic relations law would have
confirmed the contractual capacity of wives and recognized the validity of
separation agreements. 14 Mansfield certainly intended in these and other
cases to make it possible for husbands and wives to agree under delimited
circumstances to change given terms of the marital relationship.15
But, instead, in 1800 Mansfield's successor as chief justice, Lord Kenyon,
overruled all Mansfield's decisions concerning married women's contractual
capacity. In Marshall v. Rutton, 16 the language of which provided the
clich6s of marriage law in England and America for a century, Kenyon held
that, at least for common law decisionmaking, a contract between husband
and wife that altered the terms of the marriage relationship would never be
enforced. Such a void contract, Kenyon wrote,
has for its object the contravention of the general policy of the law in set-
tling the relations of domestic life, and which the public is interested to
preserve; and which, without dissolving the bond of marriage, would place
the parties in some respects in the condition of being single, and leave them
in others subject to the consequences of being married, and which would
introduce all the confusion and inconvenience which must necessarily re-
sult from so anomalous and mixed a character.... [I]t may be asked how it
can be in the power of any persons by their private agreement to alter the
character and condition which by law results from the state of marriage,
while it subsists. .... 17
Relying on Marshall v. Rutton, Lord Eldon, the English chancellor, re-
fused in 1805 to allow English courts of equity to determine the circum-
13. Ringsted v. Lanesborough, 99 Eng. Rep. 610 (1783); Barwell v. Brooks, 99 Eng. Rep. 702
(1784); Corbett v. Poelnitz, 99 Eng. Rep. 940 (1794). See generally R.J. Peaslee, Separation Agree-
ments Under the English Law, 15 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1902).
14. It should be noted that historians today recognize that the shift from status to contract was
never as smooth as legal historians and legal theorists once imagined. See generally R. STEINFELD,
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR (forthcoming 1991). On the general incommensurability between
received understandings of legal history and the history of family law, see generally Michael Gross-
berg, Crossing Boundaries: Nineteenth Century Domestic Relations Law & the Marriage of Family &
Legal History," 1985 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 799, 799-848.
15. In Rex v. Mead, 97 Eng. Rep. 440 (1758), for example, he ruled against the writ of habeas
corpus taken out by John Wilkes for the return of his wife. She had left him after he had "used her
very ill," id. at 440, and the two of them had negotiated articles of separation including the provi-
sion that he was "never to disturb her or any person with whom she should live." Id. In his
decision, Mansfield ruled that this agreement was "a formal renunciation by the husband, of his
marital right to seize her, or force her back to live with him." Id.
16. Marshall v. Rutton, 101 Eng. Rep. 1538 (1800).
17. Id. at 1539.
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stances that would justify a voluntary separation. Indeed, he regarded
contracts to separate as absolutely unenforceable in equity. No attention, he
thought, should be paid to the "impertinent and scandalous" dicta in Mans-
field's opinions that appeared to recognize a separated wife as the equivalent
of a feme-sole. 18 The uniform understanding of marriage was, rather, that
the original marital contract should be indissoluble and permanent, on the
principle that "after that sacred contract [husband and wife] should feel it to
be their mutual interest to improve their tempers .... The contract of mar-
riage cannot be affected by any [other] contract between the parties."' 9
Words to live by, and words American courts repeated constantly
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. According to the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, for example, ruling in an 1836 case involving a couple
who had already lived apart for many years, a wife could not enforce a sepa-
ration agreement in the absence of legitimate grounds for divorce. 20 Her
very right to appear was, according to the court, against the current of legal
authority.21 At common law, husband and wife could not contract with each
other. Even in equity, a wife could not usually sue under her own name.
According to the court, however, the principle was "of deeper consequence"
than "mere adherence" to common law and equitable precedent. 22 It went
directly to the public policy of maintaining the inviolability of marriage.
"The well-being of society, as well as the policy of the law and the objects
and duties of the marital contract require, that those who are united in mar-
riage should live together."' 23 The court, in a touch of realism, noted that the
law provided "no coercive remedy" to enforce this duty. 24 But the law had
created powerful incentives to keep couples together, chief of which was the
knowledge that courts would not enforce agreements between husband and
wife.
[I]n this very disability to contract with each other, in the utter incapacity,
by their own mere will, to absolve each other from the reciprocal rights and
duties which the law of their [marital] contract has imposed upon them, in
the consequent dependence of the wife upon the husband, and the contin-
ued liability of the husband to support the wife, the law furnishes powerful
motives, which operate most strongly upon those who might be least
moved by other considerations, to the promotion of harmony and peaceful
cohabitation in married life. 25
18. St. John (Lord) v. St. John (Lady), 32 Eng. Rep. 1192, 1194 (1805).
19. Id. at 1194-95. See generally LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE 154-56 (1990).
20. Simpson v. Simpson, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 140 (1836).
21. Id. at 141.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id.
25. See id.
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The image of compulsory matrimony, enforced with truly blind justice, on a
couple that would surely never again live together, is striking and
mysterious.
It was also a pervasive image, one marshalled repeatedly in orthodox legal
writing. Consider the case of poor Mrs. Beach of Oneida County in New
York, who in 1842 appealed the dismissal of her slander suit against Mrs.
Ranney. 26 According to Mrs. Beach's complaint, Mrs. Ranney had falsely
called Mrs. Beach a thief and sexually incontinent. As a result, Mrs. Beach,
who lived apart from her husband, claimed to have suffered "pain of mind
and body." Her husband had "abandoned" her, that is, he had stopped
recognizing her as his wife and no longer provided financial support. Her
neighbors refused to assist her as they had before been accustomed to do. In
particular, neighbors Smith and Raymond, who had previously provided her
with fuel, clothing, and provisions, no longer would do so. She had been
turned out of the local moral reform society, and local children threw stones
at her house and called her a strumpet.27
The case before the New York Supreme Court revolved around the "deed"
of separation between Mr. and Mrs. Beach that "allowed" her to live apart
from him. This agreement contained a covenant by the husband that his wife
could sue, either under her own name or in the names of herself and her
husband, to recover property or "for any damage or injury which she might
sustain to her person, character, goods etc.," and that he would do nothing
"to hinder the progress of such suits, or in any way interfere therewith. ' 2
Such a provision was routine in separation agreements and, from the wife's
perspective, one that was absolutely necessary if she were to have any secur-
ity in her new "separated" life.29
When Mrs. Beach sued Mrs. Ranney, she sued in her husband's name as
26. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
27. Id. at 310.
28. Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill 260, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
29. Under the existing legal rules, a husband possessed the right to recover for many legal
wrongs done to his wife; he owned the cause of action. Slander was different. As a wrong done to a
wife's personal reputation, a wrong done to her individual identity, a husband had to join his wife's
name to the complaint when he sued. Like other forms of personal property that came to a wife
during the marriage, her husband would own the money recovered in the suit after it had been
"reduced to possession." However, he did not own the cause of action or the judgment itself. If he
died before the property had been reduced to possession, the judgment would not become part of his
estate, but instead would go to his wife. Thus, according to legal authorities, if he sued, he had to
include her as a named party in the litigation. Nothing, however, in the existing law required him
to sue to protect her reputation. In that respect, slander was no different than other legal wrongs
committed upon a wife. Only a husband possessed the right to decide whether to initiate suit on
behalf of his wife. Therefore, Mrs. Beach needed a contractual agreement with her husband that
she had the right to use his name along with hers in a slander case. Otherwise, she would be
remediless if he were unwilling to sue. See generally TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND
FEMME 212-20 (Amasa Parker & Charles Baldwin eds., 3d ed. Albany 1867).
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well as her own, relying on her separation agreement for her right to do so.
But, as she and the courts soon discovered, Mr. Beach had gone to Mrs.
Ranney and her husband soon after she initiated suit and waived any right he
might possess to sue them for slander. And so, when the case was set for
trial Mrs. Ranney defended on the grounds that Mr. Beach had "released"
all rights under the cause of action. The result was that the lower court
dismissed Mrs. Beach's cause of action.
30
Chief Justice Nelson, in his opinion for the supreme court, began by re-
viewing the English authorities. Since Lord Kenyon's opinion in Marshall v.
Rutton, it was, he said, the unquestioned rule that husband and wife cannot
"by any agreement between themselves, change their legal capacities and
characters."' a Public identities cannot be changed by private agreements.
As a result, all of the "numerous covenants" typically contained within sepa-
ration agreements, covenants intended to "enforc[e] a continuance of the sep-
aration," covenants that, among other things, "go to prevent a suit for
restitution for conjugal rights, to restrain the husband from exercising per-
sonal control over the wife, to resign the children of the marriage to her,"
were void and not enforceable at law. 32 Nelson knew, and conceded reluc-
tantly, that courts of equity had often enforced many of these provisions.
But even an equity court would never, he believed, enforce the particular
covenant at issue in this case, a covenant by which a husband appeared to
delegate to his wife his legal right to sue. In any event, "in a court of law,
where the rights, duties, disabilities and obligations arising out of this inter-
esting domestic relation, exist in uncontrolled vigor notwithstanding the vol-
untary arrangement of the parties to the contrary, no such effect can be given
to it."'33 Here, he concluded, such a written promise "is condemned as waste
paper, by the soundest principles of policy, morality and law."
34
Orthodoxy implies the existence of heterodoxy, and there were important
alternative voices within American law. Notable among them was James
Kent who, as chief justice of the New York Supreme Court, as Chancellor of
New York, and as the author of the renowned Commentaries on American
Law, consistently argued for a more realistic perspective on contracts be-
tween husbands and wives.35 To Kent, the goal was not to insist on a fic-
30. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill at 316.
31. Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill at 262.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 264-65.
34. Id. at 265.
35. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1st ed. New York, Da Capo 1926-30).
There were a number of English treatises intended, at least in part, to be read as repositories of
arguments justifying separate maintenance agreements. See generally JAMES CLANCY, A TREATISE
OF THE RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (2d
ed. New York 1837); JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREE-
MENTS (Dublin 1790).
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tional marital unity. It was, rather, to look at the parties in terms of their
actual relationship and their moral responsibilities. To Kent, separation
meant that there had been a real change in the relations between a married
couple, a change that could not properly be ignored by a court.36
Other judges, particularly those sitting in courts of equity, shared Kent's
legal judgment, even if they disagreed with his perspective. Some regarded it
as settled law that certain provisions of well-drafted agreements between hus-
band and wife, via trustees, would be enforceable in equity. They rhetori-
cally hated those agreements, but they felt disabled by precedents that
appeared to confirm their partial legitimacy. Thus, Chancellor Walworth,
Kent's successor in New York, who had in 1834 labelled a contract between
husband and wife as, among other things, "an assumption of a false charac-
ter" and "contrary to the real status persona" of the parties, 37 later felt him-
self bound by established principles to enforce provisions of just such a
contract. 3
8
In part, but only in part, the differences between judges' views on ortho-
doxy and heterodoxy reflected the contrast between contending streams of
precedents emanating from common law and equity courts respectively.
Equity chancellors like James Kent identified their roles with a broader con-
ception of institutional discretion and responsibility than did common law
judges such as Samuel Nelson. The chancellors thought of themselves as
properly looking behind the formal legal status; they also thought of them-
selves, at times, as protectors of the rights and interests of dependent women
and children. The latter concern would not necessarily lead them to enforce
contracts between husband and wife since, often, those contracts had the ef-
fect of leaving the wife without support. But equity law also provided a rhet-
oric for enforcing contracts not enforceable at common law. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of equity has always been dependent upon the unavailability or
inadequacy of common law remedies.
There is much more that ought to be said about the institutional locations
of these decisions. For the moment it is important to note that both courts
(common law and equity) and legal scholars acknowledged conflict over the
36. See Fenner v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (rule prohibiting a spouse from
testifying against the other spouse did not apply to a woman who had a valid separation agreement
with her husband).
37. Rogers v. Rogers, 4 Paige Ch. 515, 517 (N.Y. Ch. 1834).
38. People v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47 (N.Y. Ch. 1839); Champlin v. Champlin, 1 Hoff. Ch. 55
(N.Y. Ch. 1839); Heyer v. Burger, 1 Hoff. Ch. 1 (N.Y. Ch. 1839); Rogers v. Rogers, 4 Paige Ch. 516
(N.Y. Ch. 1834); Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige Ch. 483 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). When Walworth followed
this course, he was retracing a path already worn by Lord Eldon, who had been unhappily com-
pelled to the conclusion that he was bound to enforce a contract between a husband and a trustee
for the benefit of a wife. See Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland Ch. 544, 554-56, (Md. Ch. 1830); Emery
v. Neighbour, 7 N.J.L. 145 (1824).
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contractual capacities of husbands and wives. The issue was almost always
reduced to a question of the rights and capacities of a wife in a state of sepa-
ration. Conflicting decisions, they knew, resulted from "different sentiments
and different decisions, by different men, at different times. ' '39
But even as judges and treatise writers acknowledged the contested nature
of their doctrinal understandings, they also sustained their belief that con-
tracts between husband and wife, in particular contracts that varied signifi-
cant terms of the marital relationship (e.g., separation agreements), were
presumptively unenforceable and void. Judges like Chancellor Walworth
who might, on occasion, rule in favor of the validity of such agreements, did
so, always, with a long (and often long-winded) qualifying preface that such
agreements were, by and large, inconsistent with marriage as it ought to be
understood. (Kent is, again, an exception to this generalization.) 4°
We are left with two related mysteries. First, and the less interesting of the
two, is how nineteenth-century American judges could continue to use the
language of marital unity and marital transformation to describe marriages
that had practically ceased to exist. So many of these cases involve couples
who had separated and who had led separate lives for years. Indeed, typi-
cally, they came into court, not because one of the two had decided to en-
force the terms of the separation agreement, but, to the contrary, because the
other of the two had relied, at what we might consider a rather late day, on
rights or expectations derived from the original marriage contract. The
plaintiff or complainant's goal was to undo an agreement on which both
spouses had relied, often for many years. Yet, the judges largely refused to
recognize the reliance interest of the couples, refused to recognize their sepa-
rated status, and insisted on an illusion of marital unity as the foundation for
judicial decisionmaking.
We can mobilize stock explanations for this mystery. First, in deciding
these appellate cases, the judges' concern was with the law and with public
policy, not with the situation of the litigants before them. Recognizing and
enforcing a contractual agreement would have given other potential litigants
the "wrong" message, would have told couples that they could, at least
39. Emery, 7 N.J.L. at 146.
40. Joseph Story's treatise on equity law summarized the law of separation as follows: The cen-
tral principle of the law of separation was that a deed of separation did not relieve a wife from any
of the ordinary disabilities of coverture. A separation agreement between husband and wife, with-
out trustees, would be utterly void; a separation agreement with trustees would never be enforced as
an agreement to separate, but only as far as maintenance was covenanted by husband, and he was
exonerated from debts by the trustees. Husband and wife could not covenant against a future suit
for restitution of conjugal rights, nor could they covenant for a future separation. If the couple
reconciled, their doing so would void the agreement. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 1427, at 761 (13th ed. 1988)
(7th ed. 1857).
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sometimes, renegotiate the terms of the marital relationship. And that would
have had baleful consequences for the society. Secondly, judicial rhetoric
about institutional power may have masked institutional struggles and con-
cerns, among them fears that the courts were relatively incompetent at the
task of evaluating what contracts were and were not legitimate. This may
have been so particularly in the face of the relative weakness and dependence
of married women. Courts could avoid having to confront the difficult ques-
tions involved in deciding when parties were coerced into agreements by rely-
ing on the bright-line proposition that marital terms were non-negotiable. 41
Yet, the mystery does not disappear. Often, courts appeared to insist on
their institutional obligation to protect the institution of marriage, which was
threatened by contractual behavior. The threat, though, was phrased tauto-
logically: when husband and wife contracted to change marital terms, they
were destroying a marriage defined by non-negotiable terms. At times, judi-
cial language seemed to lapse into near solipsism, as if by refusing to recog-
nize the separation of interests implicit in the contract of marriage, judges
were recreating marital harmony and unity.42 Did they really believe in such
a formalistic universe, in a marriage made from black letter legal categories?
It doesn't seem likely; yet, I feel inadequate to the task of explaining, of
demystifying, the mystery of their language.
Many of us have spent too much of our lives plumbing the obscurity of
legal language. It may be that explaining judicial weirdness is nothing more
than a legal academic's professional obsession, one that should be resisted, or
at least understood in context. Judges helped construct a strange world of
legal principles. We need to know what they did, and how they went about
it. Understanding why they didn't realize the silliness of what they were
about, is, however, both an unsatisfying and, potentially, an ahistorical
enterprise.
On the other hand, the second mystery in this story is central to our his-
torical enterprise. Why, in the face of consistent, and relatively effectual,
judicial hostility to contractual separations, did so many men and women
insist on their rights under such agreements? To pose the question somewhat
differently, why did husbands and wives, often with the aid of lawyers, draft
agreements that were presumptively void and would, under the best of condi-
tions, be enforceable only under peculiar and unpredictable circumstances?
41. On the notion of institutional competence, see generally Neil Komesar, Taking Institutions
Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
42. The standard judicial line (usually heavily dependent on the language of Lord Eldon and
Lord Kenyon) was that enforcing these agreements (between husbands and wives who were already
living apart) would lead to a dereliction of marital duties, would tempt the parties (already long
tempted, we might think) "to the voluntary repudiation of conjugal rights." And so, it would be the
law that made them do precisely what they were already doing. Rogers v. Rogers, 4 Paige 516
(N.Y. Ch. 1834); accord Florentine v. Wilson, 2 Hill & Den. 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844).
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That many did so is clear. The number of cases appearing before the courts
(particularly, but not exclusively, courts of equity) was large. And these
cases must be, almost by definition, the tip of a relatively large iceberg of
cases that ended in negotiated agreements or in unappealed and unpublished
lower court decisions. 43 It is also clear that those who made and enforced
separation agreements were not just the rich who needed to secure their
wealth; they were also poor men and women like Mrs. Beach, who owned
nothing but her once good reputation.
An odd feature of this mystery is the apparent changelessness of the terms
of separation agreements. Courts struck down covenants identical in form
and content with covenants struck down repeatedly years previously. For
example, agreements to separate, that is, agreements for future separation (as
contrasted with provisions dealing with the consequences of existing separa-
tions), were always held to be void by courts that dealt with them.44 Yet,
couples continued to make agreements for future separations. 45 It is almost
as if they were oblivious to the legal enforceability of those agreements, until,
of course, one or the other of them ended up in court trying to enforce as-
pects of an agreement. More oddly still, their lawyers, where lawyers were
used, continued to draft provisions identical to ones previously struck down.
Why did couples rely on formal legal contracts as the foundation for their
separations? Let me speculate a bit. One answer is that contract provided an
extraordinarily powerful moral vision in American society. The sanctity of
contract competed, perhaps on equal terms, with the notion of the sanctity of
marriage.46 One understood oneself as a person, as a competent being with
43. I found 16 published New York cases between 1810 and 1850 dealing primarily with the
legitimacy of separation agreements. This is a very conservative number, because a large number of
divorce cases (both vinculo and mensa et thoro) are best understood as cases involving a failed
separation agreement. The percentage of possible cases actually brought to court is impossible to
determine. One might speculate that the uncertainty of the legal doctrine on separation agreements
might have led to fewer of such nonjudicial remedies. Yet, against this must be posed the social cost
of bringing these cases to court and making failed marriages a public affair. Stone comes to a
similar conclusion that private separation agreements were used extensively in 19th century Eng-
land, in spite of uncertainty in the law. STONE, supra note 19, at 158-59.
44. Florentine, 2 Hill & Den. at 305; see also Rogers, 4 Paige Ch. at 517 (law "does not authorize
or sanction" voluntary separation agreements).
45. Stone notices the same phenomenon in England. STONE, supra note 19, at 163. It is impor-
tant to note that most separate maintenance agreements asserted that they were confirming the
terms of an already existing informal separation, often one of several years duration. See, e.g.,
Separate Maintenance Agreement between Alexander Bartram and Jane Bartram, (Dec. 13, 1785)
(copy on file at The Georgetown Law Journal) ("Whereas divers disputes and unhappy differences
have arisen between the said Alexander Bartram and Jane his Wife, which have gone to such
Length that it is altogether improper they should live together and they have accordingly lived
separate for several years past ..."). This separation agreement is discussed in Bodle, Jane Bar-
tram's "Application " Her Struggle for Survival, Stability, and Self-Determination in Revolutionary
Pennsylvania, 115 PA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 185 (1991).
46. There is extensive literature on contractualism in 19th-century America. See generally
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agency in the world, through the contracts one made.
For married women, the very act of contracting might, we may imagine,
have been experienced as transformative and regenerative, as a way of assert-
ing one's possession of an individual self capable of acting in and on the
world. In making a contract with one's husband, one asserted a formal
equality that was at war with conventional and legally approved understand-
ings of a wife's identity. Furthermore, the act of drawing up an individual
contract-and it is important to note that these agreements were deeply indi-
vidualized in their terms, shaped by the particular circumstances that a
couple had found itself in-would have given a wife a sense of herself as an
individual, with individual needs and wants and an individual history. 47 Pre-
cisely because marriage denied the possibility of contract, contracting would
become a necessary transgression. No wonder orthodox judges denied its
legitimacy; no wonder wives (and husbands) insisted on it anyway.
When wives asserted their contractual capacity, marital unity was torn
apart, the legally created identity of a wife replaced by the self of a contractu-
ally capable actor in the world. In place of the nearly unbounded relation-
ship of husband and wife, in which a wife might experience herself as unable
to resist or control her husband's power, a separation agreement posed a
limited and mutually agreed upon list of rights and duties. In that sense, the
very act of contracting was a crucial form of separation, a near emancipation.
Thus, regardless of its ultimate enforceability, a separation agreement was an
important emotional performance.
At the same time, it is important to underscore the instrumental uses and
significance of a separation agreement. Spouses, as we have seen, could not
be very confident of the enforceability of their agreements to separate. But
not acting carried great dangers for both wives and husbands. If a wife had
any hope of surviving the separation, she had to get her husband to agree to
allow her to live alone. She needed a property settlement, or, at minimum,
the use of the property she had brought to the marriage. (Usually, she would
need a trust device and trustees to give effect to either of these.) She needed
his clear agreement that she could use her own earnings. She needed his
JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
UNITED STATES (1956); CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980); Elizabeth
Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW AND HIST.
REV. 25 (1990); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age
of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIsT. 471 (1988).
47. It is important to note that these agreements, like many contracts, were framed by the partic-
ularities of the individual situations of the contracting husbands and wives. Was the husband going
to move away and be difficult to find if he missed a promised payment? Was the wife engaged in a
trade (e.g., running a tavern) that might embarrass (financially or morally) the husband? Was
either spouse likely to end up in an asylum? The individual character of the agreements was not
inconsistent with their formulaic character.
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permission to live apart from him. She needed him to promise not to adver-
tise her as a runaway, so that merchants and others would trust her and
grant her credit. She needed him to promise to allow her to keep custody of
their children. It may be that all or many of these promises were unenforce-
able in court. Still, in a society that placed great value on keeping one's
word, contracting offered her hope that he would not trouble her.
Conversely, a husband, too, had good reasons to contract. Even if his wife
lived apart from him, she remained his responsibility. He was legally obli-
gated to provide for her and for their children's support, to supply them with
their "necessaries. ' 48 Without a contract (or, in the alternative, a judicial
decree declaring her the guilty party in an action for divorce), his duties
remained unchanged, wherever she lived, no matter with whom, no matter
the circumstances of her life away from him.
The point to remember is that all of the rights and duties of the marriage
relationship would survive a separation, in the absence of an effective con-
tract. And this point was not merely theoretical or legalistic. Indeed, in
reconstructing the legal stories of various couples, I have gradually come to
the conclusion that husband's marriage rights typically came into their full
felt flowering only at the time of separation. During a "working" marriage
the social expectation (and often the reality) was of accommodation and re-
straint in the exercise of power. Although not surprising, it is worth stating
that in working marriages there was little need to talk about legal rights or
duties. But once a separation had occurred, legal rights became the focus of
marital discourse. 49 An angry and frustrated insistence on "my rights" and
the absence of "your pretended rights," became the standard refrain of corre-
spondence from husbands to their separated wives. 50
48. See Mott v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 544 (N.Y. 1832) (noting a husband's responsibilities upon
marital separation).
49. See Cruger v. Douglas, 4 Edw. Ch. 446 (N.Y. Ch. 1844), modified and aff'd, 5 Barb. 225
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
50. Id. For example, in his petition to the vice chancellor, at the beginning of his separation
from his wife, Henry D. Cruger wrote:
That while living in family concord,... your Orator, from delicacy, did not press... [his
marital rights] to the performance of any part of their duty that might be unpleasant; but
now, that he is foris-familiated, he claims all and whatever he is entitled to at their hands
in strict right.
Cruger Divorce Case Paper and Pleadings 30-31 (1844) (typescript at N.Y.U. Law library).
Henry Cruger, again, several years of separation later, vowed that if he had the opportunity, he
would not hesitate a moment to require of his wife that
"submission in all things," which every Wife should render with "reverence," and "in a
meek and quiet spirit"-which the Creator intended when in the beginning he made them
male and female, and which he has enjoined throughout his revealed will. It is woman's
most amiable position, and her only chance for respect and happiness ....
Id. at 591.
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The very forcefulness with which marital rights would be articulated in the
midst of marital conflict and dissolution provided additional incentives to try
to find a contractual resolution. Contracts became meaningful, in large part,
precisely because of the more sharply articulated vision of rights that accom-
panied marital conflict leading to separation. Suddenly, it became clear what
one should be bargaining over. It became crucial to make an agreement,
even in the midst of doctrinal uncertainty.
Finally, many husbands and wives contracted, not because they wished to
end a marriage, but because they wished to continue it, separated. The struc-
ture of marriage they responded to was not merely one that posited marital
unity and the transformation of the premarital self. It was also a structure
unambiguously committed to the permanence of marriage. The point of a
separation agreement was often not to create a private contractual form of
divorce. Simple abandonment could produce that end. The point of a sepa-
ration agreement was, rather, to resolve conflict within a marriage by al-
lowing the parties to live apart from each other. Separation agreements
modified the terms of the marriage; but the contracting parties remained, in
legal theory and in their own minds, married. Contrary to our modern un-
derstanding of separation, nineteenth-century separated husbands and wives
did not view their separations as a step on the road to divorce. Like most
other men and women in nineteenth-century American society, they believed
in the permanence of marriage.
II. DIVORCES
So, what did it mean to be married? Consider the odd case of Jane Wil-
liamson Parisien. 51 Jane, daughter of a New York shipmaster, married Peter
Williamson in 1780.52 Williamson was the British captain of a prison ship in
the port of New York during the British occupation. 5 When the occupation
ended in 1783 with the end of the Revolutionary War, he left, ostensibly for a
short voyage. He and Jane had two small children; she was pregnant with a
third.54 He gave her only twenty guineas. All of his other property went
with him.55 Throughout their three years together, she had, she reported
thirty years later, always "behaved to the said Peter . . .with the utmost
affection and tenderness and discharged towards him and her children the
51. Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389 (N.Y. Ch. 1815); see also Williamson v. Williamson,
1 Johns Ch. 488 (N.Y. Ch. 1815), in LEGAL PAPERS OF AARON BURR, 1756-1836, at reel 20 (avail-
able on microfilm from Microfilming Corp. of America, Glen Rock, N.J., 1977).
52. Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns Ch. at 389.
53. Id. at 391.
54. Id. at 390.
55. Williamson v. Williamson, I Johns. Ch. at 489.
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duties of wife and mother with exemplary fidelity and discretion."'56
According to Peter, he wrote Jane frequently after his departure, but was
shipwrecked and unable to return to her. According to Jane, she heard noth-
ing from Peter, and he went to Jamaica, became a wealthy man, and led a
dissolute life. Jane, destitute and abandoned, had, as she put it, "to struggle
with very great difficulties and distresses. '57 Nevertheless, her conduct re-
mained "irreproachable and above suspicion," and "by the most indefatiga-
ble industry and the most rigid economy she did maintain herself and their
said three children and brought up and educated those children in a reputa-
ble manner and suitable to there [sic] sphere in life."158
After seven years "passed in sadness and disappointment," she was ad-
vised, by whom we do not know, that she was released from her matrimonial
obligations, free to make another marriage. 59 Still, she continued to hope
that "Peter might return to a sense of his duty toward his wife and his chil-
dren." 6 But, after another year, she decided that he really had abandoned
her "and having no reason to expect that the said Peter, if living, would ever
again return to the United States," she married again, to Philip Parisien, by
whom she had six more children and with whom she spent the next twenty-
three years.61
In 1792, shortly after she entered into her second marriage, Peter William-
son returned to New York, where he and Jane saw each other. Evidently, he
made no claims at that time that she was still his wife, nor did he make any
provision for their children, except for one gift of seventy dollars. He soon
returned to Jamaica, and he would not return again to New York for twenty
years. 62
But in 1812, he came back and, for unexplained reasons, within a year he
began an action before Chancellor Kent for divorce, on the grounds of Jane's
adultery with Philip Parisien. Through her lawyer, Aaron Burr, Jane denied
the charge. She claimed her conduct "hath ever been chaste and discreet and
free from reproach or suspicion." By contrast, Jane claimed that Peter had
led "a dissolute and licentious life." Specifically, she accused him of commit-
ting adultery with a number of black women. She also believed he was now
56. Answer, Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389 (N.Y. Ch. 1815), in LEGAL PAPERS OF
AARON BURR, supra note 51 at reel 20, p. 310.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 311. Although she could have legally remarried in some states, see 1791 N.H. Laws ch.
94, § 732-33, New York recognized no such release from the marriage vow.
60. LEGAL PAPERS OF AARON BURR, supra note 51, at reel 20, p. 311.
61. Id.
62. Id. Sometime during the 1790s he seems to have sent for their eldest son, who was then
brought to Jamaica.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 80 Geo. L.J. 111 1991-1992
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
keeping a woman as his mistress in New York. 63
In her defense, Jane wrote that she had hoped Peter would have left her
alone to live quietly with her present husband. But since he had acted "to
vex and harass" her, she asked the court to force him to reveal his own adul-
terous relations. Thus, if the court decided that her marriage to Williamson
still survived, it could grant her a divorce from him, award her alimony, and
make him pay her court costs. 64
Kent dismissed Peter Williamson's bill, on the technical grounds that he
had introduced no evidence to prove that he was a resident of the state of
New York.65 Kent, however, took the occasion of the dismissal to comment
that the circumstances of the case were extraordinary. 66 Williamson's con-
duct had "a cruel aspect," and Kent was happy to be compelled to dismiss
the bill.67 At the same time, Kent continued, one could not infer from the
dismissal that the second marriage was valid. Indeed, it was undoubtably
null and void. "[N]o length of absence, and nothing short of death, or the
judicial decree of some Court, confessedly competent to the case, can dis-
solve the marriage tie."'68
A few months later, Williamson again instituted divorce proceedings. We
do not know what happened between the legally reunited couple in the in-
terim, but this time Jane did not contest the adultery charge, instead allowing
it to be taken "pro confesso." 69 Probably Jane and Peter, perhaps with the
help of friends, had negotiated an agreement. She, we might imagine, had
come to the sensible conclusion that if she confessed to technical adultery,
she could put her past behind her (where pasts always belong), remarry her
second husband, and get on with what remained of her life. Being divorced
by reason of adultery would not be the worst thing that could happen. And
so, once she had come to that decision, we and she might expect her first
marriage to have come to a swift legal conclusion.
But Kent refused to allow the divorce to be taken by consent, and he re-
solved "to consider this case precisely as if a serious controversy existed."
70
The case, he began, should not be reduced to "the single dry question" of
whether or not an act of adultery had occurred. 71 Technically, of course, it
had. But the statute that gave the court of equity jurisdiction to order di-
vorces where adultery was proved left discretion in the court, Kent insisted,
63. Id., manuscript of Oct. 16, 1813, catalogued on page 205.
64. Id.
65. Williamson v. Parisien, I Johns. Ch. at 392.
66. Id. at 392.
67. Id. at 393.
68. Id.
69. Williamson v. Williamson, 1 Johns. Ch. at 489.
70. Id. at 490.
71. Id. at 491.
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to decide whether divorce was the appropriate remedy for the wrong. 72 Con-
donation (the conditional forgiveness by the wronged spouse of the act of the
other) and recrimination (the proven adultery of the accusing party) were
two legal situations justifying denial by the court of a divorce, even where
adultery was proved. Kent thought he saw a similar situation in the Wil-
liamson case, framed both by the husband's negligence and the wife's relative
innocence. 73 Thus Kent denied the divorce.
Jane, Peter, and Philip disappear from the records thereafter. We might
suspect that Jane returned to her home with Philip and continued to live
with him as his wife. But how did the case affect the "respect and good will"
that she had previously earned from her neighbors? Perhaps, like many
Americans in similar situations, she and Philip moved to another state,
where they held themselves out as husband and wife. And what happened to
Peter? If, as we might suspect, Peter began the divorce case because he
wanted to marry someone else, did he marry her anyway? Did he return to
Jamaica?
The legal effect of Kent's decision was that Jane and Peter were declared
to be irrevocably and continuously married to each other, in spite of her
twenty-three year "marriage" to another man and their shared desire to be
divorced. Their long separation changed nothing; her long bigamous second
marriage changed nothing; their joint desire to divorce changed nothing. In-
deed, their very agreement, that is, their collusion, was itself a reason to deny
the divorce. The unstated but inescapable moral conclusion of the Chancel-
lor's opinion was that bigamy was a less serious moral and legal problem
than an unfair but technically correct charge of adultery. Better two mar-
riages than one divorce, even if that divorce was both desired by the parties
and would have resolved their tangled domestic situation.74
72. Id.
73. He wrote:
In the present case, the husband returned in 1792, and found his wife recently married, in
consequence of his long absence of eight years, and presumed death. Why did he not then
reclaim her, or prosecute? He did neither; but departed again from this state, and lived
continually abroad, for 20 years, acquiescing in this second marriage, and suffering her
offence to aggravate and become inveterate. She has had several children, and has spent
the best part of her life in connection with her present partner. If ever lapse of time, or
long acquiescence, formed a just bar to this kind of prosecution, this is one. Can it be fit,
or decent, or useful, that, without any reason or apology for this delay, he should now be
permitted to come into Court to expose and disgrace this woman? Most certainly not ....
Id. at 493.
74. Twenty years after the Williamson case, Chancellor Walworth echoed his predecessor Kent,
in holding against another man suing to divorce his abandoned and long remarried (indeed, wid-
owed) wife:
Although the wife does not appear to make any objection, public policy requires that a
husband who has abandoned a wife for such a length of time, and suffered her to contract
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To make sense of Kent's decision, we need to understand that in 1815,
even as late as 1840, divorce was not conceptually part of the law of mar-
riage. Today, divorce and marriage are legally inseparable. Divorce is un-
derstood to be the usual remedy for marital unhappiness, as well as for
breaches of marital rights. What happens at the time of divorce is thought to
explain what did or did not happen during the marriage. Indeed, in legal
discussions today marriage at times appears to exist in the shadow of divorce;
marriage appears almost as a residual category, as a situation that provides
the reasons why people eventually (and almost inevitably) come to seek di-
vorce. By contrast, Chancellor Kent and his contemporaries in the legal
community viewed divorce as a public process available only for public rea-
sons. If a husband and wife agreed to divorce because they, as private indi-
viduals, wanted a divorce, that agreement, all by itself, was reason enough to
deny the divorce. "It would be aiming a deadly blow at public morals to
decree a dissolution of the marriage contract merely because the parties re-
quested it," declaimed Chancellor Walworth in 1828.75 "Divorces should
never be allowed, except for the protection of the innocent party, and for the
punishment of the guilty."'76 Because of the danger of collusion and coercion
in divorce proceedings, confessions were not taken as conclusive. A couple
would be divorced (the passive tense is important here) because one or the
other had so violated a public and legislatively defined norm that it became
important for the moral identity of the innocent spouse to be freed from their
identity with the other.77
Prior to the American Revolution, absolute divorces with the right to re-
marry, divorces d vinculo, were available only in the New England colonies.
Other colonial legislatures followed English understandings of divorce as in-
consistent with a well-run polity. After the Revolution, most of the new
state legislatures passed statutes that created regularized divorce practices.
By and large, these statutes articulated quite limited grounds for divorce.
a second marriage on the supposition that she was released from the obligation of the first,
should not four or five years after the death of the second husband be permitted to blast
the character of his wife and bastardize the issue of the second marriage ....
Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige Ch. 207, 212 (N.Y. Ch. 1836).
75. Palmer v. Palmer, I Paige Ch. 276, 277 (N.Y. Ch. 1828).
76. Id.
77. KENT, supra note 35, at 82-83; see also Betts v. Betts, I Johns. Ch. 197, 200 (N.Y. Ch. 1814)
(confession alone is insufficient).
The problem of collusion was important in other suits as well. In 1848, for example, Chancellor
Walworth denied a petition for an annulment. Twelve years earlier, a 19-year-old boy had been
convinced by his uncle to marry the younger sister of the uncle's wife. The girl was pregnant by the
uncle. The nephew had never even lived with her. But, according to the chancellor, not only was
the fraud unproven and now too far in the past, but allowing such suits would be to "produce
collusion" between the two parties, "both of whom were willing to be released from the matrimonial
tie." Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. Ch. 132, 135 (N.Y. Ch. 1848).
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Even so, the general public and legal recognition that there were circum-
stances justifying absolute divorce constituted an important break with past
English practice. Moreover, the new American divorce jurisprudence result-
ing from these statutes provided the only significant change in marital legal
rights to occur in post-Revolutionary America. 7
8
Individual state legislatures defined differing norms for divorce. 79 South
Carolina, alone, allowed no divorces up to the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 80 In New Hampshire, by contrast, the legislature in 1791 passed a stat-
ute granting both husbands and wives the right to seek from the Superior
Court of Judicature complete divorces for incest, bigamy, adultery, abandon-
ment for three years, or extreme cruelty.81 Some state legislatures, notably
Pennsylvania's, retained the right to grant discretionary "legislative
divorces." 82
There was an experimental quality to much public decisionmaking with
regard to divorce. Several legislatures repeatedly varied their divorce re-
gimes.83 Additionally, courts often added complex interpretive glosses on
the legislature's intended requirements and consequences of divorce. In an
1818 New Hampshire case, for example, the New Hampshire court denied a
divorce sought by a woman whose husband had abandoned her for more
than three years. The court reasoned that the husband was too poor to make
any provision for her. To the judges, a divorce was only justified when it
provided a support award to the divorced wife.8 4 As late as 1850, New
York's highest court declared that a wife who divorced her husband because
78. Marylynn Salmon, Republican Sentiment, Economic Change, and the Property Rights of Wo-
men in American Law, in WOMEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 447, 448 (Ronald
Hoffman & Peter Albert eds., 1989). Linda Kerber regards the absence of debate over divorce
reform during the American Revolution as one of the missed opportunities of the period, particu-
larly when compared to the debate that occurred during the French Revolution. Linda Kerber,
"History Can Do It No Justice": Women and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, in
WOMEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra, at 3; see Nancy Cott, Divorce and
the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586, 586-
614 (1976) (on divorce in 18th-century New England).
79. See generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA 58-80 (1986).
80. Id. at 64-66.
81. 1791 N.H. Laws ch. 94, § 732-33.
82. Thomas R. Meehan, "Not Made out of Levity:" Evolution of Divorce in Early Pennsylvania,
92 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 441 (1968), reprinted in LAW, SOC'Y & DOMESTIC REL. 384,
386 (1987); see also Emilie Fry's Petition for Divorce (Philadelphia, Bingwalt & Co. 1859) (legisla-
tive petition for discretionary divorce) (available on microfilm from Research Publications, Wood-
bridge, Conn., 1977).
83. Several states, notably Connecticut and notoriously Indiana, experimented with being di-
vorce havens by loosening the grounds required and lowering the residency requirements. See CAR-
LIER, MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 112-15 (1867); Salmon, supra note 78; see also N.
NELSON BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1977).
84. Mary F v. Samuel F.-, 1 N.H. 198, 200 (1818).
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of his adultery was still entitled to dower (i.e., to a share of her ex-husband's
estate after his death). 5 In an important sense, she remained married to
him, even though they had been legally and fully divorced for twenty-five
years.
By the first years of the nineteenth century, there already existed a diverse
jurisdictional landscape of divorce. All states, however, understood divorce
as a public process allowed only for public reasons. Divorce laws did not
modify or impair the common law of marriage. If they had, they might have
violated the federal constitution's prohibition on laws impairing the obliga-
tions of contracts. But, properly understood, all that divorce laws did, in the
words of Chief Justice John Marshall, was "enable some tribunal, not to im-
pair a marriage contract, but to liberate one of the parties because it [the
marriage contract] has been broken by the other. ' '86 Legislators were simply
providing a public remedy for a public need.87
New York's lawmakers were often congratulated by nineteenth-century
treatise writers for the "purity" and consistency of their divorce statutes.88
Meanwhile, New York's laws also became notorious for their rigidity and
inflexibility.89 New York first passed a divorce statute in 1787, a statute in
which adultery provided the only grounds for divorce, and the chancellor in
equity was to be the decisionmaker. In 1813, the legislature reconfirmed its
understanding that only proof of adultery justified a full divorce. At that
time, however, the legislature added that either a husband's proven adultery
or his extreme cruelty would warrant a divorce d mensa et thoro (from bed
85. Wait v. Wait, 4 N.Y. 95, 109 (1850).
86. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819).
87. In 1785 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a model divorce statute:
"Whereas it is the design of marriage, and the wish of parties into that state that it should
continue during their joint lives, yet where the one party is under natural or legal incapaci-
ties of faithfully discharging the matrimonial vow, or is guilty of acts and deeds inconsis-
tent with the nature thereof, the laws of every well regulated society ought to give relief to
the innocent and injured party."
12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 94 (1908).
In his treatise, Kent asked: "[H]ow far has the legislature of a state the right, under the constitu-
tion of the United States, to interfere with the marriage contract, and allow of divorces between its
own citizens, and within its own jurisdiction?" 2 KENT, supra note 35, at 89. While Justice Story
generally agreed with Marshall's observation in Dartmouth College that the Constitution did not
restrict the general right of states to legislate on divorce, Story "was not prepared to admit a power
in the state legislatures to dissolve a marriage contract without any cause or default, and against the
wish of the parties, and without a judicial inquiry to ascertain the breach of the contract." Id. at 90.
88. E.g., 1787 N.Y. Laws ch. 69, § 1813; 1787 N.Y. Laws ch. 102, § 197; 1787 N.Y. Laws ch. 8,
§§ 76-78 (1836).
89. More than fifty years ago, my father, to whom this lecture is dedicated, came to this country.
He came, in part, because his brother, who was living in New York, had written to his Dutch family
that he had wished to divorce his wife and that in order to do so he was going to sleep with a
prostitute in New Jersey (so his wife could then charge him with adultery). The family found this
so odd that they asked my father to find out what was going on.
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and board) in favor of the wife. Such a limited divorce was essentially a
judicially ordered separation. As a result, a wife gained the right to live
apart from her husband and might gain, at the chancellor's discretion, the
rights to recover property brought by her to the marriage, to an alimony
award, and, sometimes, to the custody of her children.90
There were minor adjustments in New York divorce law after 1813. In the
late 1820s, husbands gained the same theoretical right as their wives to go to
a court of equity and ask for a divorce d mensa et thoro, although very few
ever did. At about the same time, the legislature added a penal provision to
the divorce statute, in theory forbidding the guilty party from remarrying
during the lifetime of the innocent spouse.91 Other small changes occurred
thereafter. But basically, New York's divorce law remained constant for 150
years.92
In New York, as in other jurisdictions, the idea of a "pure" divorce law,
one that reflected public policies and did not complicate or modify the funda-
mental presumption of the marriage contract that it be for life, was qualified
and undercut by the availability of extraterritorial divorces. New York's
courts at various times limited their recognition of foreign divorces, on the
principle that "[n]o sovereign is obliged to execute, within his dominion, a
sentence rendered out of it."'93 Yet ordinarily, there was little that the courts
could do if one or both spouses went to a neighboring state with a more
liberal divorce law. Moreover, if one of the separated spouses remarried in a
neighboring state, New York's courts generally recognized the legality of
that marriage, even as judges like Kent insisted on the principle of New
York's legal sovereignty.
90. 1813 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ch. 102, §§ 10-11. The notion of extreme cruelty, borrowed
from the English ecclesiastical courts was, in Kent's view, given a more expansive meaning in New
York's law. English ecclesiastical law granted such limited divorces only for propter soevitiam out
adulterium. Soevitia meant a state of personal danger. "Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies
of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to. .. that cruelty against which the
law can relieve." STONE, supra note 19, at 203 (citing Evans v. Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. 467-68
(1790)). In New York, by contrast, such divorces "are not only for cruelty, but generally for such
conduct on the part of the husband towards his wife, as renders it unsafe and improper for her to
cohabit with him, and be under his dominion and control." 2 KENT, supra note 35, at 107.
91. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 197 § 4 (1828).
92. Until the constitution of 1846, when legislative divorces were forbidden, nothing in theory
kept the New York legislature from granting additional divorces on petition, at its discretion. Yet,
although there was a continuing flow of petitions, the legislature almost never acted on those peti-
tions. As of 1839, they had granted a petition for a legislative divorce in only one instance. This
was the famous case of Eunice Chapman, who had asked in 1817 to be divorced from her Shaker
husband. WEISBROD, supra note 46 at 46-47; Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments, and Questions
on Law and Narrative, B.Y.U. L. REV. (1991 forthcoming).
93. KENT, supra note 35, at 102. See also Mark De Wolfe Howe, The Recognition of Foreign
Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 373 (1940) (discussing peculiarity of New
York divorce laws generally).
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It was not simply the availability of foreign divorces that threatened the
"purity" and coherence of state divorce policy. It was also the availability of
domestic legal processes which could be strategically manipulated. The pol-
icy might be clear and restrictive; only a wife or husband whose husband or
wife had committed adultery was entitled to a full divorce. Yet, so long as a
husband or wife were willing to confess publicly to adultery, whether or not
adultery had actually occurred, in the end there was little a judge could do to
avoid allowing couples to decide when and whether they would end their
marriages. As Kent noted, sometimes the sin of adultery was committed for
the very purpose of the divorce. Judges knew that many couples colluded in
constructing a case that would meet the technical requirements of the law.94
New York's chancellors and vice chancellors faced the problem of collu-
sion repeatedly as they tried to implement the state's divorce law. The proce-
dure Kent had developed for the court of equity hinged on whether the
accused party denied the charge of adultery or, in the case of a divorce d
mensa et thoro, a charge of cruel treatment. If he (and it was more often he
than she) did, then the factual issue of whether adultery or abuse had oc-
curred was sent to a common law court to be presented to a jury as a feigned
issue. If, on the other hand, the accused did not deny the accusation (i.e.,
took the charge pro confesso) then the case was sent to an appointed master
in chancery, who was to make a report to the court determining all facts.95
The danger of collusion did not disappear once a case was sent to a master
for report. The masters (whose fees were paid for by the litigants) were nota-
bly and predictably lax in their examination of the facts in the cases. The
judges wanted a report that established clear and convincing evidence of
adultery. They required that masters hear testimony from at least one in-
dependent witness. Doctors were sometimes used for this task, particularly if
they could testify as to venereal disease. Prostitutes and servants were also
consulted on occasion. Even when a witness was provided by the litigants
and reported on by the master in chancery, judges might reject the master's
report. In one case, the vice chancellor rejected a report of adultery founded
on the testimony of a witness who was allegedly peering through a window
when the "crime" occurred. According to the vice chancellor, the witness
could not have seen what he claimed to see because there was not enough
light available. In another case, the witness was an illiterate prostitute who
claimed to have slept with the respondent. However, her deposition read like
a fill-in-the-blanks form, and thus was not regarded as probative. 96
94. KENT, supra note 35, at 88-89.
95. Id. at 83; see Betts v. Betts, 1 Johns. Ch. 197, 199 (N.Y. Ch. 1814) (chancellor found insuffi-
cient proof for divorce decree despite party's admissions).
96. Banta v. Banta, 3 Edw. Ch. 295 (N.Y. Ch. 1939); see also Hanford v. Hanford, 3 Edw. Ch.
468 (N.Y. Ch. 1841) (insufficient evidence to grant divorce decree without testimony of physician,
[Vol. 80:95
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As far as the judges were concerned, the point was not so much whether or
which was prohibited by statute); Bokel v. Bokel, 3 Edw. Ch. 376, 377 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (witness's
testimony insufficient to prove woman who lived with defendant was not his wife); Graves v.
Graves, 2 Paige Ch. 62, 63 (N.Y. Ch. 1830) (implying that defendant must pay costs in order to
prevent collusion).
What should such testimony look like? Consider the successful testimony of Maria Johnson, a
servant, who was the primary witness in the divorce of elderly Aaron Burr (he was in his early 80s)
from Madame Jumel in 1834-36. At first, Burr had contested his wife's claim that he had commit-
ted adultery with Jane McManus, a young adventuress who was a publicist for the Anglo colony in
Texas. But, in the end, he too allowed the case to go forward pro confesso. The master's report
included the following pieces of Maria Johnson's testimony:
Q: Where was you when you saw them the first time?
A: I came up stairs to fetch a pitcher of hot water to Col Burr through the front room and
she saw Jane McManus on the settee and Col Burr had his hand under her clothes and she
saw her nakedness-
Q: Were they sitting or lying?
A: They were sitting at the present time and Col Burr had his trousers all down-
Q: Did they see you?
A: They could not help seeing me when I came in the room with the pitcher of water
Q: When was it that you next saw them together?
A: On Saturday afternoon-
Q: Where was you then?
A: I got up on the shed & turned the window blind & looked through it-
Q: Did you lay down in the shed Maria-
A: I set down on my hunkies and turned the blind & looked in
Q: Where did you see them when you looked into that window-
A: On the settee-
Q: Were they sitting or lying then-
A: they were sitting-
Q: Were there any bed clothes on that settee
A: There was a cushion on it--but no bed clothes through the day-
Q: Was there a fire in the room
A: No sir it was warm weather in August
Q: How close were [sic] they together
A: About as close as they could set together
Q: How long did you look at them
A: I looked at them till they got through with their mean act and looked at them when
they set up on the settee
Q: Do you swear that Col Burr at that time has sexual connection with Miss McManus
A: Yes sir-and I saw him several times before
Q: How old was he then
A: She does not know exactly-he was a very old man
Q: Did you ever witness any thing between them at that house in Reed Street
A: Yes she sometimes had her frock unpinned & open all behind
Q: Did you ever catch them together there
A: Yes sir I did one Sunday and Col Burr gave her a new pair of shoes not to tell-but I
did tell and will tell & always meant to tell because I was ready to go to church and he
gave me orders to go to Bear Market and get oysters for Jane McManus' dinner
Q: When was it that she caught them together
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not adultery had occurred. The true goal of the proceeding was to establish
that there was "no collusion between the parties in laying a foundation for
the suit."' 97 In the words of one vice chancellor, "[p]arties bound together by
the strongest ties may, in moments of irritation and disappointment, become
dissatisfied with each other and be mutually willing to be divorced."98 It was
the duty of the judges to resist and to discourage that inclination.99
It may seem obvious that the judges must have been fighting a losing battle
in their efforts to prevent collusion and strategic behavior. Even in the opin-
ions of the chancellors and vice chancellors, one senses a growing irritation
with the lawyers, litigants, and masters, who appeared to be frustrating the
purposes of the law of divorce.l°° Collusive divorces may have been inevita-
ble in a jurisdiction like New York with rigid and limited grounds for
divorce. 101
After all, imagine a couple no longer interested in living as a couple; per-
haps each intends to remarry someone else. If the two agreed that they
would do whatever it took to obtain a divorce, then the law became simply a
landscape to be traversed by strategically-minded litigants on the road to
A: Before she went to get the oysters
Q: What did you see
A: She saw Jane McManus with her clothes all up & Coin Burr with his hands under
them and his pantaloons down
Q: What did Jane McManus say
A: She said Oh la! Mary saw us
LEGAL PAPERS OF AARON BURR, supra note 51, at reel 25, pp. 372-76.
After the court ordered the divorce, Burr came back to ask for a rehearing, on the grounds that
he was too old to have committed adultery. This was denied by the vice chancellor. Id. at 383.
97. Hanks v. Hanks, 3 Edw. Ch. 469, 470 (N.Y. Ch. 1841).
98. Id.
99. Indeed, from the judges' perspective, even after adultery had been clearly proved, the danger
of collusion remained. In one 1835 case, husband and wife had come to an agreement as to a
settlement after the master's report establishing his adultery had been accepted by the court. Her
lawyer then suggested to the court that there was no need for a judicial decree of alimony. But
Chancellor Walworth strongly disagreed. So long as the marriage continued, he noted, she lacked
legal competence to make a valid contract with her husband. Daggett v. Daggett, 5 Paige Ch. 509
(N.Y. Ch. 1835). More importantly, such contracts, if permitted, would produce collusion. Id.
100. "It is surprising that solicitors and masters so often omit a part of what is required to be
proved under orders of reference in cases for divorce," wrote Vice Chancellor Edwards in 1840.
Dobbs v. Dobbs, 3 Edw. Ch. 377 (N.Y. Ch. 1840). Perhaps it would be "wiser and better or more
conducive to the good order and well being of society" if the legislature changed the law of mar-
riage, he wrote in a case the following year. But so long as the legislature did not do so, it remained
the responsibility of the court "to see that something more than the mere forms of law are observed
in these proceedings and that the use and abuse of the right to apply are not confounded." Hanks at
471 (1840).
101. Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
1121, 1129 (1936). As we have already seen, there were alternatives to collusive divorces, among
them, various forms of formal or informal separation and "foreign" divorces.
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marital freedom. 10 2 The rules and practices designed to prevent collusion
would become nothing more than directives or instructions that explain how
to get away with a collusive divorce. If a persuasive witness were needed, a
persuasive witness was found or created. If a deposition was not to read like
a fill-in-the-blanks form, then a form was developed that did not read like a
fill-in-the-blanks form.
Still, even as we wonder at the judges' resolve to fight a seemingly unwin-
nable battle,10 3 we need to understand the intensity of their concern to sepa-
rate marriage from divorce. Divorce was not intended to allow couples to
escape from identities assumed in marriage. Divorce, to repeat the by now
tired refrain, existed to achieve limited public purposes. It punished the
guilty for criminal conduct. A convicted husband was theoretically dishon-
ored; he became a man whose dependents were freed from his care. A con-
victed wife lost her public identity as a wife and lost the relationship expected
to be the foundation for her sense of self. More practically, she was thrown
into the world without the economic support and care of a husband. io4 Con-
versely, divorce allowed an innocent spouse to escape the moral contamina-
tion that might accompany continued cohabitation with a guilty spouse. In a
world where marital unity meant something, it was important that divorce
exist. Divorce provided a form of public punishment for a spouse who had
knowingly and criminally violated his or her public vows of marriage. 10 5 At
102. Formally, the party at fault, the one confessing to adultery, was not permitted to remarry. I
wonder, though, if a large part of the agreement between the two would have included negotiations
over moving to another state, where remarriage would not have been prohibited.
103. See Note, supra note 101, at 1127 (there is no satisfactory way to prevent collusive
divorces).
104. See Argument for the Defendant, Cox v. Cox (New York, Bryant & Co. 1856) (summing up
to the jury). I do not mean to suggest that these were equivalent punishments. Nor did the judges.
Reading the divorce cases of the first half of the 19th century has impressed on me the judges'
intense protectiveness of wives' legal rights, driven by their assumption that once a wife's reputation
was lost, she would be quite destitute. In one 1828 case, the Chancellor noted that the effect of a
divorce d mensa et thoro at the request of the husband was that "the wife would have no claim on
his property for her support. He will be released from the obligation of supporting her, and she will
be turned off penniless upon the community, unless she has separate property for her maintenance."
Palmer v. Palmer, 1 Paige Ch. 275, 277 (N.Y. Ch. 1828). The statute gave the court no authority to
provide for her support out of the husband's property. "It must therefore, be a very strong case
which will induce this court to grant a final separation on the application of the husband." Id. at
278. In their treatises, legal scholars often mentioned the double standard that regarded a wife's
adultery as a greater wrong than that of her husband (often on the theory that her adultery unpun-
ished created the possibility that he would have to raise a bastard as his own child). See KENT,
supra note 32, at 88-89. In practice, judges regarded the existence of a social double standard, the
reality of the far greater social cost faced by an errant wife, as reason enough to look with greater
suspicion on a husband's accusations of a wife. See generally ROBERT GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND
DIVORCE IN VICTORIAN AMERICA, 1800-1900 (Institute for Legal Studies, Legal History Program,
Working Papers Series 1, 1986).
105. Bishop and Swift regarded divorce as morally less problematic than legalized separations,
which created continuing temptations to the commission of adultery. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
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the same time, in the orthodox view, divorce was not to be understood as a
form of voluntary exit available to all married couples.
Couples continued to exit from unhappy marriages, both with and without
judicial sanction. Often, when they did so, one or the other spouse would
remarry, with or without a formal divorce from the first marriage. Like Jane
Williamson Parisien, they would assume--or hope-that their former spouse
would not return to embarrass them.
If appellate court records are any indication of an underlying social reality,
bigamy was rife in early America. 1°6 Surprisingly, when bigamous second
(and sometimes third) unions were challenged in court, judges were remarka-
bly accepting and accommodating to the bigamous pair. Indeed, one discov-
ers the same judges who struggled to maintain the rigid purity of divorce law
developing presumptions that protected bigamous second marriages from
challenge. '0 7
Judges refused to convict someone of bigamy on the basis of confession or
reputation. The fact of the first marriage had to be proved by placing the
actual recorded marriage license into evidence.' 0 8 By contrast, the general
legality of an informal, possibly bigamous, common-law marriage could be
established on the basis of notoriety and, in general, could only be challenged
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 217-25 (Boston, Little, Brown 1852);
ZEMPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 190-93 (New
York, Windham 1795). There was also a tradition in Protestant theology dating back to Milton
that justified divorce. To Milton, the spiritual justifications of divorce included, among others, the
Christian's need to separate himself from evil and the Christian's need to end all relationships that
interfered with his primary relationship with God. GLADYS WILLIS, THE PENALTY OF EVE: JOHN
MILTON AND DIVORCE (1984); Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married
Woman's Consciousness, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (A. Sarat ed.) (forthcoming).
106. I mean this statement as an invitation to someone to write a social history of bigamy in
America. It is based on a reading of the fact patterns presented in the published cases. Lawrence
Stone makes the same observation of England in the 18th and 19th centuries. STONE, supra note
17, at 142. Of course, the reader will understand that when I speak of "bigamy" in this sense, I
mean the social experience or phenomenon of persons who have married again prior to the death of
or divorce from a spouse. "Bigamy" as a legal category is precisely what the courts did not apply to
these cases, and it was, in any event, a contested concept. For one example of the struggle over the
public status of what one might call either serial monogamy without divorce or common law big-
amy, consider the case of President Andrew Jackson. At the time of his marriage in 1791, his wife
was still married to another man. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF
THE AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821, at 57-70 (1977); see also Lawrence Friedman, Crimes of Mo-
bility, 43 STAN. L. REV. 637, 638 (1991) (characterizing late 19th-century bigamy as a crime of
mobility).
107. On the rhetorical legal commitment to monogamy, see generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985);
Carol Weisbrod & Pamela Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Century Forms of Mar-
riage and the Status of Marriage, 10 CONN. L. REV. 828, 834-36 (1978).
108. People v. Humphrey, 7 Johns. 314, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
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by a pre-existing spouse.1o9 After 1830, in New York, a second marriage
contracted in good faith, where the first husband or wife had been absent for
five or more years, was voidable, not absolutely void. 1 0 The aggrieved
spouse's only remedy would be to file a bill and proceed to annul the voidable
marriage. If the second husband and wife continued to live together after the
decree, then the legally recognized spouse had adultery grounds for a di-
vorce. But, as Chancellor Walworth noted in 1836, the complainant's own
adultery would provide a "perfect answer" to the complaint." '
Courts implicitly analogized issues of serial matrimony to property dis-
putes. The existence of an apparent marriage by a man and woman who held
themselves out to the public as husband and wife (i.e., present possession)
was, if not nine-tenths of the law, at least very important presumptive evi-
dence of a valid marriage. Theoretically, a husband or wife harmed by the
later marriage of their spouse, could impugn the title of that later marriage.
But, as with adverse possession in property law, so in these cases the "right-
ful title holder" could eventually lose the capacity to challenge the marriage
if he sat on his rights in the face of his wife's "open and notorious" adultery
(i e., living as the wife of another man).1 2 The second, originally bigamous,
marriages would have become legally acceptable by the very absence of any-
one capable of challenging them.' 13
109. Fenner v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 38, 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); see also GROSSBERG, supra note 107
(on common-law marriage).
110. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 139 § 6 (1830).
111. Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige Ch. 207, 208-09 (N.Y. Ch. 1836). Because the second marriage
in the Valleau case was probably entered into prior to passage of the statute, the chancellor relied
instead on the Williamson case to hold that the complainant husband was barred from challenging
his wife's second marriage because her "adultery" was open and notorious, and he had done noth-
ing to stop it for more than five years. Id.
See McNeil v. McNeil, 3 Edw. Ch. 550 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) (chancellor has no jurisdiction once wife
leaves state); Lewis v. Lewis, 3 Johns. Ch. 520 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (same). In Lewis an abusive and
intemperate husband abandoned his wife. When she brought a petition for divorce, he admitted to
adultery but refused to answer when asked whether he had contracted a second marriage. Id.
112. Valleau, 6 Paige Ch. at 211. The story in this case is virtually identical to that in the Wil-
liamson case. As with the Williamson case, this was a collusive suit; the wife in Valleau made no
objection to the suit. Yet, Chancellor Walworth strongly objected to efforts to "blast" her character
in a divorce proceeding (id.); see also In re Deming, 10 Johns. 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), where
Deming's wife remarried J.S. after he was convicted of the crime of counterfeiting which made him,
in law, civilly dead. When he was pardoned, he sued for the return of his children on the theory
that his parental rights revived with the pardon. The court agreed, but at the same time, empha-
sized that the pardon could not operate to divest someone of rights acquired in reliance of the
conviction and civil death. " 'Policy and humanity' required that he get as complete a restoration of
his private rights as may be consistent with the intervening rights and interests of others." Id. at
233-34. The image propounded by the court was of wife and second husband as something close to
bona fide purchasers.
113. In this way, the emergence of an American law of common-law marriage was the necessary
complement of the general unwillingness of the courts to sanction bigamy. See generally GROSS-
BERG, supra note 107, at 64-101.
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Consider the case of Abigail Rose, who in 1841 asked the Rensselaer
county surrogate for her widow's portion of her "husband's" estate." 4 Fifty
years earlier, she had married Jonas Frink. However, they soon separated.
Shortly thereafter, Jonas married another woman and moved to Massachu-
setts. In 1830, he died in the poorhouse in Hoosick, New York. Meanwhile,
Abigail worked as the housekeeper of one J. Owens. Around the turn of the
century, she married S. Thurston, who left her the next day "and never
claimed her as his wife." She then lived with Owens as his wife, and she used
his name until his death in 1826. Two or three years later (but prior to the
death of Jonas Frink), she married Rose. She continued to live with Rose
until his death in 1838.115
According to the surrogate, her original marriage to Rose was void. How-
ever, after Frink died, there were sufficient facts to warrant the inference of a
de facto marriage to Rose. Accordingly, he ruled that she should be awarded
a wife's portion of Rose's estate. The chancellor agreed. 1
6
Alternatively, consider the story of Tillatha Catherine Bennett and Isaac
Graham, both early Anglo settlers of California. Isaac had deserted a first
wife in 1830 in Tennessee. In 1845, he married twenty-one year-old Cathe-
rine, who lived with her mother and brothers on land near Graham in Santa
Cruz. They had married by signing a document prepared by Graham, pre-
sumably because there was no available protestant minister. Her mother dis-
approved of the "marriage" and tried to get the local justice of the peace and
the United States consul in San Francisco to separate the two. The justice of
the peace wrote to the consul concerning Graham's refusal to comply: "[be-
cause] other Gentleman .. .approved of his Marriage, . . .nobody could
force a separation."' " 7
In 1849, a son from Graham's first marriage arrived in California and
learned, unexpectedly, that his father was still alive and living north of Santa
Cruz. A few months later, while Graham was away with his son on business
114. Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige Ch. 574 (N.Y. Ch. 1841).
115. Id. at 574-75.
116. Id. at 582-83. To take a second example, when the widowed Hannah Van Buskirk asked for
her dower rights in 1820, it was revealed that her husband of more than 35 years had been married
previously. He and his first wife split up around 1783. She went to Long Island, from there to
Canada, and had never since been heard from. He stayed and married Hannah. The New York
Supreme Court declared that Hannah was entitled to dower. According to Chief Justice Spencer,
all that was known was that Van Buskirk had once cohabited with another. There was no evidence
of marriage. Even if they had been married, the first wife must be presumed dead around 1790, at
the end of seven years absence. What of the fact that Hannah had married Van Buskirk well before
1790? No matter, declared the court. Continuous cohabitation provides conclusive evidence of a
marriage. Jackson, ex. dem. v. Claw, 18 Johns. 346, 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). The court relied on
Chief Justice Kent's decision in Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). See generally
GROSSBERG, supra note 107 (on common-law marriage).
117. DOYCE NUNIS, JR., THE TRIALS OF ISAAC GRAHAM 67 (1967).
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in San Jose, Catherine took their two children and a disputed amount of gold
and fled. In a letter published in a San Francisco newspaper, she would later
explain her flight on the grounds of Isaac's cruelty: "I was so tired of being
beat and having bowie knives drawn over me ... (for twice that old brute
Graham drew his bowie knife across my throat till the blood ran down my
breast, and I expected every day he would kill me). '"'1 8
Catherine's flight took her, dressed as a man, to Hawaii and then to Ore-
gon, where she was discovered by her husband, who took the children and
what was left of the gold from her. 1 9 She then went back to Santa Cruz and
brought suit against Graham for custody of the children. Suit followed
countersuit between them. One judge granted her custody rights. But when
Isaac seized the children, while she was in San Francisco on a business trip,
another judge confirmed his right to their custody. 120
Catherine sued Isaac for personal damages and assault and for ruining her
good name by inveigling her into a bigamous relationship.' 2' One suspects
the point of this cause of action was to establish the illegitimacy of the chil-
dren. As a result, Catherine, as mother, would establish her sole legal right
to custody. When the case came to trial, the central question was whether
Graham had married her in good faith. He claimed that he believed his first
family had been massacred by Indians on the way to Texas. He also said that
he believed that his first wife had remarried and had had an illegitimate child
and that Texas law allowed a marriage to be invalidated after seven years
absence. At the end of the trial, he was held liable and ordered to pay $2500
damages. 22
On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court reversed in a decision
that incorporated common-law marriage into California's law. "Marriage is
a civil contract, and no form is necessary for its solemnization," declared
Justice Heydenfelt.123 Where parties are "able to contract, an open avowal
of the intention and an assumption of the relative duties, which it imposes,
are sufficient to render it valid and binding."' 24 Where, as in this case, there
was such a marriage, a father's children were "entitled to look for and de-
mand from him, his care, maintenance and protection. And he has the same
right to their custody, control and obedience."' 25 The mother, legally noth-
118. Id. at 119.
119. Meanwhile, his son by the earlier marriage had managed to kill Catherine's brother and to
wound her mother. Id. at 74-97.
120. Id. at 68.
121. Id. at 67-70.
122. He was acquitted of assault. Id. at 70.
123. Graham v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 503, 506 (1852).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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ing but a wife, was left without any rights at all. 126
CONCLUSION
In the eyes of the law, at least through the first half of the nineteenth
century, bigamous marriages were less threatening to the permanence of
marriage than either voluntary divorces or contractual separations. How can
that distinction be explained? One senses that for some judges the tacit rec-
ognition of a second, more or less informal, marriage represented a recogni-
tion of the existence of human fallibility and change. Family law could not
demand that husbands and wives lead perfect lives. The ideal of the aban-
doned wife, who remained at home, like Penelope sewing (or taking in laun-
dry, or farming, or whatever), chaste and pure, waiting for her one, true, but
long absent husband, was an important cultural icon in nineteenth-century
America. But, in the real world, wives knew they needed husbands to sur-
vive, and divorces were expensive and, in states like New York, largely un-
available. The need for a husband was exacerbated by a legal order that left a
wife (a feme-covert) ordinarily without the means of contracting or engaging
in most legal or business affairs. So, like Jane Williamson and Abigail Rose,
they often remarried. And when their cases came to court, judges like Chan-
cellor Kent recognized the felt necessities of their situations.
127
Likewise, husbands (and wives) who abandoned first spouses were under-
stood as morally wrong to have done so. They would have to live with their
sin throughout the rest of their lives. Yet, when they made new "marriages"
that demonstrated their commitment to the conventional order of marriage,
courts saw little reason to challenge the order they had reestablished in their
lives. In typical American fashion, the judges were giving precedence to the
present over the dead hand of past entanglements and obligations. 128
Judges hearing these cases gave crucial weight to the new or newer
couple's leading a life that substantively reflected a public understanding of
being married. That is, it was important that the couple held themselves out
publicly as married, and that there was a present community that recognized
them as married. As the California Supreme Court held in the Graham case,
it was crucial to find that there was a real "assumption of the relative duties"
that marriage imposed. Being married in a way that a court might recognize
126. Id. at 507. Although common law marriage bore some resemblance to the "marriage by
bond" relied on by the English settlers of Spanish North America as a way of avoiding Catholic
conversion, Hans Baade has demonstrated that the decision of the California Supreme Court was
not an application of pre-annexation Mexican California law. The "uncertainties" of Spanish and
Mexican marriage law may, however, have made common-law marriage doctrine particularly at-
tractive to the judiciary. Baade, supra note 1, at 78-79.
127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
128. See generally J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
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required evidence that a couple lived a conventional married life: as if man
and woman had been united in marriage, as if their identities had been trans-
formed, as if they had no right to vary the terms of their relationship, as if
their relationship was necessarily one for life. If a couple lived as if those
conditions were necessarily true, then the technical and legalistic reality that
these conditions articulated roles that a man and woman were assuming vol-
untarily and privately would give way to the practical reality that the man
and woman had become husband and wife.129
By contrast, married couples, who made contracts with one another to live
apart and to change the received terms of their marriages, or, worse yet, who
colluded with each other to subvert legal processes in order to gain "legal"
divorces from unhappy marriages, challenged the public structure of mar-
riage. Their lives defied orthodox expectations. Their willingness to alter
legal rights and remedies through strategic use of the law, sometimes
through perjury, undercut the law's legitimacy. Such couples put into ques-
tion the capacity of public marriage to unite a couple within the bonds of
matrimony, to transform them permanently into husband and wife. Ulti-
mately, that subversion was much the greater danger to orthodox views on
marriage. 130
129. For a modern example of a very similar analysis, see the decision of the California Supreme
Court in the famous 1976 case of Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
130. In conversation, J. Willard Hurst described this overstated and unsuccessful concern with
the sanctity of the legal process as framed by the judges' institutional egoism.
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to gauge what the actual public demand for divorce reform was
throughout the 19th century. A simple answer is that if the majority of voters had wanted divorce
reform they would have gotten it. We might well imagine that an ambivalent and contradictory
legal structure that both upheld the permanence of marriage and, at the same time, provided forms
of partial or complete exit for those couples that could no longer live together, met the desires of a
large percentage of the population. On the other hand, another plausible view is that the existing
law constrained would-be reformers. Posed more positively, millions who wanted divorce may have
been kept from it by repressive political and religious authorities. The latter sentiment is nicely
captured in a late 18th-century English poem, describing what would happen if the law (which at
that time recognized no forms of divorce, except by private bill before Parliament) appointed "A
Popular Functionary," to release couples from the bonds of matrimony:
Did but the law appoint us oqe,
Tired couples to release again,
What shoals of all degrees would run,
To break their matrimonial chain!
The widow old, Herself and gold
Who to the healthy spendthrift gave;
And the rich churl, Who took a girl,
Poor wretch! with one foot in the grave.
Prudes, who at men would never look,
Yet slyly tasted Hymen's joy;
And wild coquets, who husbands took,
When they could get no other toy:
Millions would try The know [knot] to untie:
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The quiet defense of serial bigamy in nineteenth-century law found rein-
forcement and analogies in many areas of American jurisprudence. Just as
there was in American constitutionalism a persistent, although often sup-
pressed, critique of restrictive definitions of citizenship, so in American fam-
ily law one finds a persistent critique of formalistic categories which were
restrictive of marriage and which created traditional barriers to entry.1
31
More importantly, judges drew on a strong tradition of what I think of as
functionalism or realism in the law. This tradition required judges, as a cor-
relate of their political legitimacy, to recognize "real" relations as they ex-
isted in the world. Rights holders were those who did what rights holders
do. Those who acted as autonomous individuals--choosing, constructing,
protecting, destroying-grew entitled to rights identified with the choices
they had made. So, when men and women chose to live together as husband
and wife, taking on the transformed identities and limitations that those roles
implied, they grew entitled to be considered as husband and wife.
132
Still, the irony is inescapable. The point of marriage was to create a public
structure of rights and duties, not alterable by the wills, goals, or desires of
husbands and wives. The legal act of marriage united a man and a woman in
a permanent relationship, one that gave each prescribed and non-negotiable
identities. Every one of the four themes implicit in the definition of mar-
riage-themes of unity, identity, non-negotiability, and permanence-might
become contested and contradictory in particular contexts. All could be
challenged as narrow expressions of an antiquated orthodoxy. All were re-
garded, however, as inextricably bound to marriage as it was (as opposed to
what it might become)-that is, to marriage as a public structure.
Yet, out of the very concern of judges to protect the institutional integrity
of marriage, to protect its nature as a public institution, came a recognition
of marriages made as knowing expressions of the private wills, goals, and
desires of men and women publicly incapable of so doing. And what that
ironic result suggests to me is that for the judges, as for other public officials,
the most important feature of marriage was the public assumption of a rela-
tionship of rights and duties, of men acting as husbands and women acting as
Toward the goal of liberty,
Lord! what a throng
Would crowd along,
And in the midst my wife and me!
Charles Dibdin, A Popular Functionary, in ROGER LONSDALE, THE NEW OXFORD BOOK OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VERSE 624 (1984).
131. See GROSSBERG, supra note 107, at 103-26 (discussing the general attack on barriers to
entry to marriage). On constitutionalism, see Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and
The Rights That Belong to Us All, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1019 (1987).
132. Hartog, supra note 131, at 1019; Elizabeth Clark, Religion, Rights, and Difference in the
Early Woman's Rights Movement, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 29, 58 (1987).
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wives. The legitimacy of common-law marriages rested, I suspect, on their
reflection of a widely recognized structure of power and rights that shaped
the conduct of all who would be understood as being husbands and wives.
What did it mean to be married in 1840? It meant that one assumed the
character of a husband or a wife and that, in consequence, one was joined in
a permanent relationship of power and submission. The point to be drawn
from the bigamy cases is that a stable and public identity as a husband or a
wife took precedence over the formalities of monogamous marriage. The law
of marriage did not, in this sense, make men and women into husbands and
wives. Marriage, as experienced and as understood in the law, rested on the
structured, interrelated, and predetermined legal identities of husbands and
wives, not the other way around.
I began this inquiry into the institution of marriage in the nineteenth cen-
tury thinking that a picture of marriage as an institution was a necessary
preface to the legal history of marital conflict. I now think that the legal
history of struggles over rights and powers between husbands and wives is
the necessary preface to the history of marriage as an institution. A version
of the tail wagging the dog, perhaps, but a story that continues to our own
day.
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